0

K. Annapoornam v. The Secretary to Government, Personnel and Administrative Reform(s) Department and Ors. W.A.(MD) No. 792 of 2016

|
Reading Time: 5 minutes

On the 5th of July, 2016, a division bench of the Madras High Court disallowed the appeal of a police aspirant. She was disqualified from a selection round for failing to meet the minimum threshold. The selection round involved a 100 metre sprint in a stipulated time period. She prayed before the court that she be allowed to move on to the next stage despite this. She pointed to a previous case[1] in which a transgender aspirant was so allowed despite failing to complete the sprint in the stipulated time. Thereafter, she argued that a similar relaxation of rule be made for her. She placed special emphasis on the fact that the transgender population has a physical advantage over cisgender women candidates. Arguably, here she was referring to a transwoman. This blog will first summarize the case and then concentrate on two streams of thought: 1. Do transgender women candidates have a physical advantage over cisgender women candidates? 2. Is it a good strategy to pit the interests of cis-women against transgender persons?

FACTS

The appellant, Ms. Annapoornam, had applied for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police in the State of Tamil Nadu. There were 3 stages in selection: 1. Written examination; 2. Physical standard and physical endurance test; 3. Viva. The appellant cleared the 1st stage and also cleared part of stage 2—the physical standard test. The second part of stage 2 was a physical endurance examination, tested through: 1. Long jump; 2. Shot-up; and 3. A 100 metre sprint. Ms. Annapoornam cleared the long jump and shot-put stages with ease. In fact, she performed quite well in these tests and was awarded a “two-star” remark for her performance. A two star performer is one who surpasses the minimum standards required in the physical tests. The last 100 metre sprint remained. The test required that the sprint be completed in 17.50 seconds but Ms. Annapoornam completed it in 18.09 seconds. She fell 19 micro-seconds behind the requirement. Consequently, she did not move on to the viva stage of the selections. She challenged her exclusion on several grounds in a writ petition she filed before a single judge of the Madras High Court at Madurai. However, the judge dismissed the writ on 26.10.2015 reasoning that, “when the petitioner herself has admitted that she was unable to pass the 100 meters run within the specified time limit viz., 17.50 seconds, this Court may not be in a position to interfere with the impugned [disqualification] slip.”[2] Accordingly, she approached division bench of the High Court on appeal, once again challenging her disqualification.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

The appellant, contended that she: 1. Had a better academic record than most of the candidates that had moved on to stage 3 (she held an English MA degree); 2. She had secured 2, 2 star performances in her physical endurance test, in long jump and shot put, respectively. Therefore, she argued, it is unjust to fail her in the physical endurance test; and 3. She argued that a different bench of the Madras High Court had allowed a transgender candidate, who fell short of the sprint requirement by 1.1 seconds, to proceed to the next stage of selection. She prayed that a similar allowance be made in her case as well especially because, she argued, transgender persons (it appears from the context of the case that she was referring to a transwoman) have more physical power.

DECISION

Summarily, the court decided that the physical tests were relevant to the role of the sub-inspector and accordingly the requirement to pass those tests were not arbitrary. Consequently, they dismissed the writ petition. On the contention of having made a discretionary allowance for a transgender candidate, the court noted that following the Supreme Court decision in the NALSA case, the State governments were supposed to take steps to protect the interests of the transgender community, but no such steps have been taken by the State government. Accordingly, the court, taking note of the discrimination and lack of parental support faced by transgender persons, prescribed a different standard in the 100 metre sprint. However, the court declined to make any observations about whether cisgender women should deserve more consideration than transgender persons. Arguably, the court took recourse to the fact that as per the Supreme Court’s direction, the State government was anyway required to institute various measures for transgender persons; the court’s direction in the Prithika Yashini case being a step taken because of the government’s failure to do so.

DO TRANSWOMEN HAVE A PHYSICAL ADVANTAGE OVER CISGENDER WOMEN?

There are two things that this case throws up that need some consideration and though they have not become an issue in this case, they may in the future. 1. Do transwomen have more physical power than cisgender women? In this situation particularly, we are concerned with their ability to run a 100 metre sprint and the question is whether their physical make up gives them any kind of advantage. The manner of framing the contention in this case assumes a person assigned male at birth having all the strength and speed advantage deemed to be associated with that sex; she later transitions. However, recently, the science related to sports and sex has come into intense focus with the Duttee Chand case before the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS). The case concerned the exclusion of an Indian athlete, Duttee Chand from the 100 metre national team because her testosterone levels were found to be higher than those permitted for athletes in the female category. The exclusion was based on an assumption that higher testosterone contributes to better athletic performance. The Court of Arbitration for Sports ultimately found (page 71) that higher testosterone in males contributes a 10-12% athletic advantage over females. However, the competitive advantage for women with increased testosterone renders a negligible advantage over other female athletes of about 1-3% which would not justify placing Duttee Chand in the male category for competitions. It also noted that many other factors such as genetic and biological variation, coaching, nutrition, etc. also contribute to competitive advantage. Without more, it is difficult to argue that these findings are directly applicable in comparing competitive advantages of trans and cis women. This difficulty becomes especially apparent when considering a trans persons who underwent hormonal therapy to align their bodies to their true gender. Therefore it might be best to treat it as an open question until the science behind question be tested and weighed in light of environmental, biological and social factors.

PITTING INTERESTS OF WOMEN AGAINST TRANSGENDER PERSONS

Second, this case pitches the interests of cisgender women against transgender women. Here, the court was not in the difficult position to pick one over the other, but the conceptual stage has been set. This is a dangerous sign. Both the movement for women’s rights and for transgender rights have fought long and hard battles for equality and dignity, and freedom. Both these movements fight for freedom from patriarchal rules of society. It is not a good strategy to use one against the other to move ahead. Instead, other strategies could be considered. For example, in this case, the appellant could have argued, that her academic grades are more than the requisite threshold, that she is well educated and that she has 2 star performances in 2 out 3 physical tests. The appellant could have asked the court to use their discretion in light of all her records, and see if she can be allowed to move on to the next stage despite falling short by 19 micro-seconds.

 

[1] K. Prithika Yashini v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Uniformed Services Recruitment Board W.P. No. 15046 of 2015.

[2] K. Annapoornam v. The Secretary to the Government and Ors. W.P. (MD) No. 19170 of 2015.

[3] International Association of Athletic Federations.

[4] The materials submitted are not available publicly.

S. Tharika Banu v. The Secretary to Government, Health and Family Welfare Department and Ors. W.P. No. 26628/2017

|
Reading Time: 6 minutes

On the 29th of November, 2017, a single judge bench of the Madras High Court decided whether a transgender woman[1] could be admitted to an undergraduate degree even though she had not obtained certain minimum marks for admission. The High Court decided the transgender woman, S. Tharika Banu, must be admitted to the degree because the, “minimum marks holds good only for “males” and “females”, and not for transgender persons. The court made this relaxation for Banu keeping in mind, the rareness of her demand, the harassment and discrimination faced by transgender persons in society, and the directions of the Supreme Court in the NALSA case. In this blog, I will discuss two aspects of this judgment: 1. Will this decision open doors for more transgender persons to apply for undergraduate degrees at less than minimum marks? 2. Does this decision apply to those transgender persons who identity as male or female, and not transgender?

Before delving into these issues, it may be helpful to know that in the NALSA case, the Supreme Court had directed that the Centre and State governments treat transgender persons as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, a constitutionally protected category, and provide them reservation in matters of admission to educational institutions. However, the latest version of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2016 has no mention of a reservation provision. Therefore, if this version of the Bill is to pass, transgender persons will have no legal entitlement to reservation. Until this Bill solidifies into an Act, the direction of the Supreme Court is law (Article 142)[2] and binds Tamil Nadu State Government and accordingly, its instrumentalities like the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes Commission. Suppose the 2016 Bill passes as it is and becomes an Act– it can be challenged in the Supreme Court for failing to provide reservation to transgender persons. The court will have two options. It can by its complete justice provisions, bypass the Act and restore its earlier directions, or it may examine afresh whether denial of reservation to the transgender population violates the constitution. As the Supreme Court itself has expressly stated that transgender persons are “legally entitled and eligible” for affirmative action measures [para 60], the court will have strong reasons for upholding this challenge.  Meanwhile, representation can be made before State Backward Class Commissions for their omission to include transgender persons in the other backward classes (OBC) category, and a writ can be filed before State High Courts against the State Government for violating the equality right of transgender persons by failing to provide them “equal protection of the laws” through reservations schemes.

  1. WILL THIS DECISION OPEN DOORS FOR MORE TRANSGENDER PERSONS TO APPLY FOR DEGREES AT LESS THAN MINIMUM MARKS?

Arguably, yes. In this particular case, Banu had obtained 537/1200 (44.75%) marks whereas the minimum threshold to be considered for admission to the undergraduate course was 50%. A little background about Banu is important here because arguably, the court considers the background an important reason to provide relief. Banu was assigned male at birth “but due to chromosomal aberration…started identifying himself more as a female than as a male.” Without more it is difficult to say what this phrase means but arguably this signifies that Banu had an intersex condition at birth/developed one later, if that is possible, and as a consequence started to identify as a woman. This was not acceptable to her parents, and Banu left home at a young age, and underwent a sex-reassignment surgery (SRS). Thereafter, she took on a traditionally more feminine name and has been living as a female. She also passed her higher secondary exam with the abovementioned marks. Recounting the stigma faced by transgender persons in society, the court surmised that,

…for the first time in history, a transgender person has knocked on the doors of this court seeking to consider her candidature for admission in BSMS course…it is a welcome change that they have come forward to get higher education. instead of living normal stigmatic life as a transgender and in spite of undergoing various insults and even assaults, harassments in the hands of some unruly elements, when they come forward to get education, the same has to be encouraged and based on technicalities, the transgender persons coming forward to join educational institutions should not be driven out…[i]t is not as if many transgender persons have applied for seats…on very rare occasions, this kind of claims would be made and that has to be considered with compassion and benevolence. [paragraphs 9-12]

Accordingly, the court directed the State to admit her into the undergraduate course (Bachelor of Siddha Medicine and Surgery). A reader, upon examining this reasoning, may be tempted to think that the court is granting a one-off prayer, especially since the government has provided no reservation schemes for transgender persons in Tamil Nadu. However, this does not seem to be the thrust of the judgment read as a whole. Though the court has directed Bhanu be admitted into the course, it has also stated explicitly,

“The Court hopes that this order would be a first step to throw open doors of educational institutions for the entry of ‘Transgenders’ for their social empowerment, employment status, dignity, right etc….” [para 13]

This signifies the court’s intention that this order be not one of a kind, but be the first to open doors for transgender persons in education institutions. One of the ways for doing so, is by providing them reservation as directed by the Supreme Court and also by another bench of the Madras High Court. The court finds the State “guilty of not implementing the order” of these courts mentioned and rejects the rationale of the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes Commission for denying reservation to transgender persons in educational institutions. The commission had argued that since transgender persons comprise only .007% of the total population of Tamil Nadu, it would not be “feasible”, numerically, one may suppose, to provide any reservation for them.

  1. DOES THIS DECISION APPLY TO THOSE TRANSGENDER PERSONS WHO IDENTIFY AS MALE OR FEMALE, AND NOT AS TRANSGENDER?

Arguably, it does. it is important to address this point, because in its reasoning, the court has especially stressed that the 50% cut-off applies to “males” and “females” and not to “transwoman” or “transgender.” At first glance, it may seem that this reasoning can exclude those transgender persons who identify as male or female and do not want to call themselves transgender. However, the judgment should not be read in this way especially because the Supreme Court has expressly stated that transgender persons have the right to identify as male, female or third gender. Therefore, this judgment should apply equally to transgender persons who identify as male or female. Equally, this judgment should apply to persons who do not identify with the sex assigned to them at birth, this being the manner in which the Supreme Court understood the term transgender, and this could cover gender-queer persons. Finally, various regional identities such as hijra, aravani, shiv-shakti etc. are all included. In short, this judgment should apply to all those persons covered within the ambit of transgender persons, as per the NALSA judgment. This is of course, till the 2016 Bill is enacted. If enacted, as is, the 2016 Bill will severely cut down the ambit “transgender.” For the full argument on this, please see here.

  1. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SRS, INTERSEX CONDITION ETC.

The intersex condition is classified as a “physical abnormality” and a “chromosomal aberration”, and  the role that SRS has played in the grant of the relief is unknown though seems to be of importance. It is doubtful if court would have ruled similarly if SRS had not been performed especially because the court states,

“those unfortunate persons, due to some physical abnormality and due to the act of genes, suffer from transforming into transgender and could not identify themselves with regular gender namely, male and female.”

It could be that this statement does not mean very much, as indeed, if construed as a whole, it signifies some kind of metaphorical transformation into a transgender person– akin to the stuff of legends. However, what we can certainly take away from this is that we do not know if the court would have decided similarly if the petitioner had not undergone the SRS.

However, there are some good points to note about the judgment: 1. the court recommends that the government carry out a survey to determine the number of transgender persons in Tamil Nadu for proper compliance with the NALSA decision; and 2. the court uses pronouns in line with respect to the petitioner’s gender identity (she). Finally, it is worth raising a point about caste here. The petitioner belonged to the Scheduled Caste (SC) and had in fact asked to see the merit list for the SC category. The court did not find it necessary to grant this relief in light of its decision. One does not know whether the seat Banu was allotted was one from the SC category or from the OBC category. Since the Supreme Court direction states that transgender persons must be treated as socially and educationally backward classes, it could be that transgender persons of different castes may have to deal with a loss of caste, or at least have a fractured caste identity– caste A for all times, but a member of backward class for the purposes of admissions in educational institutions. Law/policy will have to devise a way to handle this possibility. Although fracturing of caste identities may be a beginning on the path to diminish the value of caste identities but such eventualities may cause resentment in the short run.

 

[1] Actually, it is not clear whether the petitioner identifies herself as a woman or as transgender. The facts suggest that she has been living her life as a female but there does not seem to be a suggestion from the side of the petitioner that she would call herself transgender. However, the court uniformly describes her as a transgender woman.

[2] The Constitution of India, 1950.

0

Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India Ministry of Law and Justice Secretary Writ Petition No. 76/2016

|
Reading Time: 7 minutes

On the 8th of January, 2018, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court ordered that the Suresh Koushal decision which upheld the constitutionality of S.377[1] requires reconsideration. The court so ordered while hearing a writ petition challenging the constitutionality of S.377 (Navtej writ). Substantively, the judges stated emphatically that the “litmus test” for finding S.377 unconstitutional was if it offends constitutional morality, regardless of how societal morality on the issue was poised. Should a people exercise the “inherent” right to their sexual orientation within the confines of constitutional morality, the court stated, they will receive the protection of Article 21.[2] To be sure, S.377 is still constitutional, both because the Navtej writ is not finally disposed and because the Suresh Koushal ruling is still in operation. However, these observations no doubt strengthened the judicial discourse on the protection of sexuality rights. However, this blog is not about these substantive proclamations. Instead, in this blog, I will attempt to answer two procedural questions which arise from this January order of the Supreme Court:

  1. Was the Supreme Court empowered to admit the Navtej writ given that the Suresh Koushal decision is due to come up for hearing in the curative process? [Yes]
  2. How does the order passed in this writ, affect the 377 curative petition[3], if at all? [Not at all]

However, before delving into these inquires, a few preliminary matters need to be clarified.

WHAT IS A CURATIVE PETITION?

A case goes through two stages at the Supreme Court: judgment and review. A curative petition is a petition that can be filed after the disposal of the review petition. It is a judicially created process at having yet another look at the decision. Its genesis is owed to the Ashok Hurra Case (2002, SC) which stated that although finality of a decision is very important for certainty and stability of a legal system, the inherent powers granted to the Supreme Court allow it to reconsider its decision to prevent miscarriage of justice. The court then laid down illustrative grounds for understanding miscarriage of justice:

  1. Petitioner must show a violation of principles of natural justice. If they were not a party to the proceedings in the Supreme Court, they must show that the decision adversely affects their interest; if they were a party to the proceedings they must show that they had not been served with notice and the proceedings went on as if he had been served notice [this last ground was successfully pleaded in one of the three successful curative petitions—MP v. Sugar Singh]; or
  2. The judges at the Supreme Court proceedings failed to disclose their connection to the subject matter or parties, which gives an apprehension of bias disadvantaging the petitioner.

Aside from these points, the curative petitioner must also show:

  1. The points raised in the curative have been raised in the review;
  2. A senior lawyer must certify as to the fulfilment of the conditions 1-3
  3. Three of the senior-most judges, along with the judges that heard the original Supreme Court decision will then preside over the matter. The curative petitioners have to make those arguments in these petitions which can demonstrate either points 1 or 2 above (or other grounds which can point to miscarriage of justice)[4] at the first stage to get the petition admitted. If the petition is admitted, the Hurra case says, “the same bench” must hear the matter on merits. The phrasing “same bench” here is confusing. Does it mean the same bench which originally heard the case or does it mean the same bench which is considering the curative? This issue does not arise in the 377 curative as both judges who originally heard the case have since retired. However, I will address this issue here for completeness. Sometimes, the same bench that admits the curative decides, barring of course, the judges that retired since the curative was admitted [see, for example, Bhaskar Lal Sharma v. Monica, Navneet Kaur]. Sometimes, another bench decides though the admitting bench is still on the rolls [for example, MP v. Sugar Singh][5].

This procedure has now been formalized and is housed in Order XLVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. However, it is important to note that the curative petition arguments are gateway arguments. Once the petition is admitted on points 1 and 2 above (or other miscarriage of justice grounds), the original cases are restored (in our case, the petitions filed by Suresh Koushal etc. and Naz and others at the Supreme Court level) and the court now hears arguments on the points addressed in those filings.

  1. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE NAVTEJ WRIT

This brings us to the point of maintainability of the Navtej writ. Lawyers for Navtej Johar asserted in their writ that the issues raised by their writ petition are “varied and diverse” from those raised in the 377 curative. I argue that this distinction is only surface level and it is unnecessary. It is surface level because once the curatives are admitted, the original SLPs and written submissions will be restored and arguments will once again be heard on the merits of those filings. Those who followed the Koushal arguments in 2012, will recall that they were chiefly around Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the constitution. The Navtej writ also makes Article 21 arguments[6] and so substantively, both petitions will be raising similar arguments.

This distinction is also unnecessary because Res Judicata only operates between “the same parties and in respect of the same cause of action.” [Sanjay Singh v. UPSC, SC 2007]. That means that the same parties cannot bring a case based on the same grounds once the Supreme Court has decided the dispute between them (assume review, curative are all done). In the Navtej writ, parties are different from the Suresh Koushal proceedings even though the subject matter is the same (i.e. constitutionality of 377). This is legally permissible. On this point, consider the case of Sanjay Singh v. UPSC. Here, unsuccessful candidates at a judicial selection exam challenged the scaling method deployed by the examiners to calculate scores. This exact question had come up before the Supreme Court earlier in a case called UPSC v. S.C. Dixit wherein the scaling method was found constitutional. This decision was reaffirmed at the curative level as well. The UPSC sought to argue that Sanjay Singh’s case should be dismissed because the Dixit case had already found the same scaling method constitution. The Supreme Court replied that the ratio decidendi [logic of the decision, loosely] of a previous case can always be challenged by a subsequent case [in fact, this is how legal reasoning changes]. What cannot be changed is the order in the previous case. This literally means that a subsequent court cannot pass an order reversing the final order of a prior judgment.[7] This would in the Koushal context mean that the Navtej court cannot pass an order which changes the result of the Koushal review from “dismissed” to “admitted” [See Sanjay Singh, para 10]. However, a subsequent proceeding filed in the court challenging the rationale of the Koushal judgment by different parties is not prohibited.

Similarly, if the parties remain the same but the points of dispute between them change, they can file a writ even though a curative petition on different points has been dismissed. However, since this point is not in issue in the context of the 377 litigation, I am not pressing it here. What transpires from this discussion then is that the Supreme Court was empowered to admit the Navtej writ even as the 377 curative is “pending.”

  1. HOW DOES THE NAVTEJ ORDER AFFECT THE 377 CURATIVE?

The Navtej order does not affect the 377 curative in any way. As of now, the 377 curative petition has not been admitted. The last hearing on the curative matter was on the 2nd of February, 2016. In that hearing, a three judge bench of the Supreme Court ordered that the petition should be placed before a five judge bench to decide whether the petition should be admitted, in the first instance. If the five judge bench admits the curative, it will then decide whether the original Supreme Court decision was right on the law. Therefore, at this time, the curative has not been admitted, and the review process being over, for all practical purposes, the decision of the Supreme Court is final [See on this point, Ashiq Hussain Faktoo, SC 2008]. For an analogy, consider a judgment of the High Court that has not been appealed to the Supreme Court. Although hypothetically, the decision could be overturned, until an appeal is admitted to the Supreme Court, the decision is final as between the parties. Similarly, until the Supreme Court admits the curative petition, the review decision is final. The curative and the Navtej are two entirely different beasts; the results of one, leave alone an intermittent order, does not automatically decide the fate of the other.

Now, the lawyers of the Navtej writ have two choices. The first is to argue that the Navtej writ be tagged along with the curative hearing, assuming the curative is admitted. In that situation, the fates of these two petitions will be tied. The other, and perhaps, the more profitable path is for the lawyers to argue that the curative and the writ be heard separately so that assuming that the 377 curative fails to overturn Koushal on merits, there is yet another chance for the constitutionality of 377 to be decided via the Navtej writ. This has been done once before in the case of Abdul Gabbar Khan. Khan appealed in the Supreme Court claiming compensation on the basis of the Bhopal gas tragedy settlement. A curative on the same issue was already pending in the Supreme Court[8].  Khan’s counsel was successfully able to argue that the appeal be decided after the court had heard the curative even though the court had suggested that the appeal and the curative be tagged together.

[1] S. 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalize carnal intercourse against the order of nature.

[2] Fundamental right to life.

[3] What I refer to collectively as the 377 curative is actually a bunch of curative petitions filed by Naz Foundation, parents of LGBT persons, professors, mental health professionals, Academics Ratna Kapur et. al., Voices Against 377 and Mr. X.

[4] The different curative petitioners have tried to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice through different techniques. For example, Naz has tried to show that the Koushal decision omitted to consider the amended S. 375 while pronouncing the decision. The mental health professionals have chiefly argued that the expert opinion and scientific evidence provided by them on homosexuality was not considered by the Supreme Court. For other arguments raised to demonstrate miscarriage of justice see, curative petitions filed by some of the other petitioners here.

[5] The judges who decided the actual Supreme Court judgment complained of had since retired.

[6] Primarily, that the right to sexuality, sexual autonomy and sexual partner are rights protected by the fundamental right to life guaranteed by the Indian constitution (Article 21).

[7] See especially on this point, para 21 of Shaukat Hussain Guru v. Delhi Writ Petition (Criminal) 106/2007) and U.P.S.C. v. Subhash Chandra Dixit Civil Appeal 8609/2013.

[8] At the last hearing on this matter, the court directed that the matter be heard in open court to decide the issue of admission, in the first instance. The matter has since not been listed for such a hearing.

My thanks to Ramki and Adv. Mihir Samson for helping me figure out where curatives and the Navtej writ can be found online. My thanks also to my young cousin, Smriti, who helped in so many intangible ways to make sure that this blog goes up on time.